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I. Introduction 
When fifteen-year-old Alyssa Beck ran away from home, 
her life changed forever.1 Fleeing an abusive father, Alyssa 
moved in with friends.2 One friend introduced her to a few older 
men who took her under their wings.3 They let Alyssa stay in 
their apartments and began buying her food, clothes, hair 
products, and makeup.4 
“I thought these guys were my boyfriends,” Alyssa said.5 
“Everything that was missing in my life they supplied to me.”6 
One of these men was Ian Sean Gordon.7 Gordon was the 
first to rape Alyssa.8 He shoved a pillow over her face and called 
his friends, telling them they could “do whatever [they] want to 
 
 1. See Michelle Miller, Inside the World of Child Sex Trafficking and the 
High-Tech Approach to Saving Victims, CBS (Mar. 31, 2018), https://perma.cc
/4XZH-NV9E (last visited Jan. 23, 2020) (describing how Alyssa became 
involved with a sex trafficker) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 2. See id. (explaining that the first time Alyssa ran away was after her 
father hit her with a belt and a subsequent Social Services investigation failed 
to discover any abuse). 
 3. See id. (stating that the men allowed Alyssa to sleep in their 
apartments, bought her clothes, and provided her food as part of their 
“grooming” scheme). 
 4. See id. (“They gave me the clothes that I needed, the hair stuff, the 
makeup and they made me feel pretty.”). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See id. (stating that Alyssa met Gordon after two weeks of living on 
the streets). 
 8. See id. (explaining that a few days after meeting Alyssa, Gordon 
became violent and brutally beat and raped her). 
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her” for twenty dollars.9 After the rape, Gordon threatened to 
kill Alyssa and her family if she tried to leave.10 
As the days progressed, Gordon drove Alyssa to various 
hotels where he supplied an endless stream of customers who 
paid him to rape Alyssa.11 Gordon got her addicted to drugs and 
took all of her clothes to prevent her from running away from 
the hotels.12 
Alyssa almost gave up, until one person gave her the 
strength to attempt an escape.13 “I remember one time I was 
there and it was after a really bad beating and rape,” Alyssa 
said.14 “I remember sitting there and thinking about my little 
brother. And I just remember thinking about my brother’s 
smile. And just thinking about his innocence.”15 
The thoughts of her younger brother inspired Alyssa to run 
out of a motel room one day while Gordon was not looking.16 But 
within seconds, Gordon was behind her, grabbing her and 
dragging her to his car.17 “You’re gonna die today,” Gordon said 
as he threw Alyssa into the car.18 Alyssa did not allow fear to 
paralyze her—when the car came to a stoplight, she jumped 
out.19 Beaten and bloody, she ran down the expressway until she 
 
 9. See id. (“I heard him start call[ing] to people and telling them, ‘Hey, 
I have this girl here, you can come do whatever you want to her, just for 20 
dollars.’”). 
 10. See id. (explaining that it is common for sex traffickers to use violence 
and threats to compel their victims to act in a certain way). 
 11. See id. (discussing Alyssa’s memories of being raped by dozens of 
men). 
 12. See id. (“They know that pain and the addiction can force their victims 
into providing more services in order to get their fix.”). 
 13. See id. (“But in her darkest days, there was one person who kept her 
going.”). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See id. (stating that after two weeks of being held in captivity, Alyssa 
summoned the courage to attempt an escape). 
 17. See id. (“Next thing you know this thing comes behind me and grabs 
me by my hair and this thing was [Gordon].”). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. (stating that Alyssa attempted one last escape). 
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found a phone and called her mother.20 Her mother called 
police.21  
The FBI eventually took on Alyssa’s case, which led to the 
arrests of seven people involved in buying or trafficking 
Alyssa.22 Gordon pleaded guilty to sex trafficking and was 
sentenced to life in prison23—one of the first life sentences 
handed down to a trafficker in the United States.24 
Alyssa’s story, though utterly horrific, is far from unique.25 
Around the globe, an estimated 40.3 million victims share 
similar realities to Alyssa’s.26 Modern-day slavery, commonly 
referred to as human trafficking,27 continues to be the 
fastest-growing and most lucrative global industry—ahead of 
the drug industry—because a human can be used, abused, sold, 
and exploited time and time again, unlike drugs that disappear 
once consumed.28 State-sanctioned slavery was abolished in 
 
 20. See id. (explaining that Alyssa passed out and then made her way to 
a Regency Inn to call her mother). 
 21. See id. (stating that Alyssa’s mom called the police before picking 
Alyssa up). 
 22. See id. (stating that the FBI’s “Operation Abandoned Hope” led to the 
arrests of seven people by the summer of 2010). 
 23. See id. (stating that Gordon and five others pleaded guilty to sex 
trafficking and another man pleaded guilty to producing child pornography for 
his part in filming Alyssa). 
 24. See id. (stating that the federal judge imposed a life sentence due to 
“the brutality and violence and complete and utter lack of respect for human 
life”). 
 25. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 6 (2009) (stating that sexual exploitation makes up 
seventy-nine percent of human trafficking instances, making it the most 
common form of trafficking). 
 26. See Forced Labour, Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking, ILO, 
https://perma.cc/LCR6-39EX (last visited Jan 26, 2020) (“At any given time in 
2016, an estimated 40.3 million people are in modern slavery . . . .”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 27. See What Is Modern Slavery, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, https://perma.cc
/S5A8-PQ32 (last visited Jan. 26, 2020) (“‘Trafficking in persons,’ ‘human 
trafficking,’ and ‘modern slavery’ are used as umbrella terms to refer to both 
sex trafficking and forced labor.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 28. See ANNA RODRIGUEZ, MA’AM ANNA: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF A 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING RESCUER 31 (Amanda Bindel ed., 2013) (comparing the 
human trafficking industry to the drug industry). 
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1865,29 but the practice has only expanded since then.30 Today, 
human trafficking is a $150 billion industry.31 If lined up 
shoulder to shoulder, slaves in today’s world would create a line 
from Beijing, China to Cape Town, South Africa.32 Of the victims 
currently enslaved, twenty-five percent are children.33 In other 
words, one in four victims of modern slavery is a child.34 
In 2000, Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1591, to protect children 
like Alyssa.35 It criminalized defendants who knowingly 
engaged in a trafficking act, knew the victim was underage, and 
knew that the child victim would be forced to engage in a 
commercial sex act.36 In 2008, Congress amended the statute in 
order to relax the government’s burden of proof by reducing the 
mens rea element requiring knowledge that the victim was a 
 
 29. See Slavery Abolished in America with Adoption of 13th Amendment, 
HISTORY.COM (July 21, 2010), https://perma.cc/9MZG-LWQU (last visited Jan. 
26, 2020) (noting that the Thirteenth Amendment was officially adopted into 
the Constitution in 1865) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 30. See Tedx Talks, Every 15 Seconds: Matt Friedman 
TEDxSanJoaquin, YOUTUBE (Nov. 8, 2012), https://youtu.be/iU9TeVofkDo 
(noting that the number of slaves has nearly tripled since the end of the 
Transatlantic slave trade). 
 31. See ILO Says Forced Labour Generates Annual Profits of US $150 
Billion, ILO (May 20, 2014), https://perma.cc/E4GH-W86Q (last visited Jan. 
26, 2020) (stating that every year, forced labor generates $150 billion in illegal 
profits, two-thirds of which is produced from commercial sexual exploitation) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 32. See Tedx Talks, supra note 30 (“If you were to line these people up 
shoulder to shoulder, it would take you all the way from Beijing, China to Cape 
Town, South Africa.”). 
 33. See Forced Labour, Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking, supra 
note 26 (“1 in 4 victims of modern slavery are children.”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. 
L. No. 106-386, § 112, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) [hereinafter 
TVPA of 2000] (enacting the child sex trafficking statute to strengthen 
“prosecution and punishment of traffickers”). 
 36. See John Cotton Richmond, Federal Human Trafficking Review: An 
Analysis & Recommendations from the 2016 Legal Developments, 52 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 293, 302 (2017) (explaining Congress’s original wording and 
intent for the statute). 
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minor.37 Under the amendment, a conviction now requires that 
a defendant either knew the victim’s age, recklessly disregarded 
the victim’s age, or had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” 
the victim.38  
Subsection (c) of the statute states: “In a prosecution under 
subsection (a)(1) in which the defendant had a reasonable 
opportunity to observe the person so recruited, enticed, 
harbored, transported, provided, obtained or maintained, the 
Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the 
person had not attained the age of 18 years.”39 This provision 
caused confusion among scholars40 and district courts41 
 
 37. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 222, 122 Stat. 5044 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) [hereinafter Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act] (providing that the Government need not show that a defendant knew the 
victim had not attained the age of eighteen to prove a “reasonable opportunity 
to observe”); see also United States v. Duong, 848 F.3d 928, 933–34 (10th Cir. 
2017) (“Section 1591(c) specifically states that the government should be 
relieved of a burden when a defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe 
the victim.”). 
 38. Compare TVPA of 2000 § 112 (requiring a person to knowingly engage 
in a trafficking act, know that a victim was underage, and know that the child 
victim would be compelled to engage in a commercial sex act), with Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act § 222 (amending the statute to include a 
“reckless disregard” and “reasonable opportunity to observe” standard). 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 40. See Richmond, supra note 36, at 303 (“At the time these amendments 
were passed, it was unclear how courts might apply the . . . ‘reasonable 
opportunity to observe’ provision.”); see also Tiffanie N. Choate, Comment, 
Protecting the Lydias, Linas, and Tinas from Sex Trafficking: A Call to 
Eliminate Ambiguities of 18 U.S.C. § 1591, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 665, 689 (2013) 
The court must also consider whether to instruct the jury to focus 
on either the reasonableness of the opportunity to observe the 
minor or the reasonableness of the conclusions drawn from the 
opportunity to observe the minor . . . . Neither case law nor 
legislative history provides any concrete guidance as to the 
appropriate definition of “reasonable opportunity to observe.” 
 41. Compare United States v. Wilson, No. 10-60101-CR-ZLOCH
/ROSENBAUM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75149, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 27, 2010) 
(“[W]here the Government elects to proceed under the reckless disregard level 
of mens rea, Section 1591(c) requires the Government to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt not only that the defendant acted in reckless disregard, but 
also that the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person 
recruited.”), with United States v. Rivera, No. 13-CR-149(KAM), 2015 WL 
7455504, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2015) (“[T]he government may satisfy its 
burden for the mens rea element in one of three ways, by proving that the 
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regarding the standard of proof necessary to show a “reasonable 
opportunity to observe” a victim. Some courts held that the 
provision required a showing of both a reckless disregard of the 
victim’s age and a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the 
victim.42 Others found it required either a showing of a reckless 
disregard or a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim.43 
Under the latter interpretation, any defense regarding lack of 
knowledge of a victim’s age would thus be irrelevant to a 
prosecution under the “reasonable opportunity to observe” 
provision.44 This interpretation requiring strict liability 
eventually became the settled standard once cases reached 
federal appellate courts.45 In other words, a “reasonable 
 
defendant (1) had knowledge of the victim’s age; (2) acted in reckless disregard 
of the victim’s age; or (3) had a reasonable opportunity to view the victim.”). 
 42. See Wilson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75149, at *7 (stating that the 
Government must prove a defendant’s reckless disregard of the victim’s age as 
well as his “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim); see also United 
States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 31 (2d Cir. 2012) (Kearse, J., concurring) 
I am not persuaded that the amended section imposes strict liability 
on a defendant who has a reasonable opportunity to observe his 
underage sex-trafficking victim but who neither knows nor 
recklessly disregards the fact that the victim has not attained the 
age of 18 years . . . . It is not clear to me that when Congress, in the 
amended § 1591, specified only that such an opportunity to observe 
means that the government need not prove that the defendant 
“knew,” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), Congress meant that the government 
also need not prove that the defendant acted in reckless disregard. 
 43. See Rivera, 2015 WL 7455504, at *21 (stating that a conviction is 
proper upon a showing of a defendant’s reckless disregard of a victim’s age or 
upon a showing of his “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim). 
 44. See id. (stating that strict liability applies to the “reasonable 
opportunity to observe” provision). 
 45. See United States v. Lockhart, 844 F.3d 501, 515–16 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(stating that the language in § 1591(c) transformed the offense “from one 
requiring a specific mens rea into a strict liability offense”); United States v. 
Smith, 662 F. App’x 132, 136 (3d Cir. 2016) (stating that this provision 
“imposes strict liability with regard to the defendant’s awareness of the 
victim’s age, thus relieving the government’s usual burden to prove knowledge 
or reckless disregard of the victim’s underage status . . . .” (quoting United 
States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 2012))); United States v. Davis, 
854 F.3d 601, 605 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that § 1591(c) created a strict 
liability offense); United States v. Booker, 447 F. App’x 726, 727 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(noting that “lack of knowledge of the minor’s age is not a defense if the 
defendant had a ‘reasonable opportunity to observe’ the victim.” (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 1591(c))). 
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opportunity to observe” is a standalone mens rea element and 
the statute requires a showing of either a “reasonable 
opportunity to observe” or a “reckless disregard,” but not both.46 
The appellate clarification of the correct strict liability 
statutory standard caused a new wave of confusion regarding 
what behavior constitutes a “reasonable opportunity to 
observe.”47 Director of the Human Trafficking Institute John 
Cotton Richmond opined that recent Second and Fifth Circuit 
cases applying the statue have highlighted an emerging 
question: “What evidence does it take to prove that a defendant 
had a ‘reasonable opportunity to observe’ his victim?”48 
Richmond predicts that this evidentiary threshold is likely to 
become a frequent topic of litigation, and thus, “[g]uidance will 
be necessary as future courts determine what contact or 
information is sufficient to apply the ‘reasonable opportunity to 
observe’ standard.”49  
This Note addresses how courts should interpret the 
“reasonable opportunity to observe” standard when assessing 
evidence. In other words, what quantum of evidence is, and 
should be, sufficient to prove a defendant had a “reasonable 
opportunity to observe” a sex trafficking victim? Would a 
singular brief encounter with an older-appearing prostitute 
satisfy the standard? If so, would the mere fact that the 
“prostitute” was actually a minor be the only evidence needed to 
obtain a conviction? Or would the defendant’s intention and 
attempt to order services from an adult prostitute shed light on 
the reasonableness of his observation opportunity? Moreover, in 
 
 46. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 30 (describing the jury instructions that 
required the government to prove the defendant “knew that Jane Doe had not 
attained the age of eighteen years, or he recklessly disregarded that fact, or 
he had a reasonable opportunity to observe Jane Doe”); United States v. 
Copeland, 820 F.3d 809, 812 (5th Cir. 2016) (upholding jury instructions that 
required proof that “(1) the defendant knew T.J. had not attainted the age of 
18 years, or (2) the defendant recklessly disregarded the fact that T.J. had not 
attained the age of 18 years, or (3) the defendant had a reasonable opportunity 
to observe T.J.”). 
 47. See Richmond, supra note 36, at 308, 357 (stating that the Fifth 
Circuit’s 2016 cases highlighted “an emerging question” of the evidentiary 
standard necessary to prove a “reasonable opportunity to observe,” which “teed 
up future litigation over the quantum of evidence sufficient to trigger its 
application”). 
 48. Id. at 308. 
 49. Id. at 309. 
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the age of increasing technology, would trafficking a minor 
through a webcam videochat satisfy the standard? For instance, 
would a man in the United States requesting sexual 
performances from a Filipino child over videochat constitute a 
“reasonable opportunity to observe” that child even without an 
in-person, face-to-face interaction? This Note answers these 
questions. 
Part II analyzes three recent cases that employ the 
“reasonable opportunity to observe” standard: United States v. 
Robinson,50 United States v. Copeland,51 and United States v. 
Valas.52 It then determines which factors these cases reveal as 
sufficient to constitute a “reasonable opportunity to observe.” 
Part III discusses how the currently utilized factors and 
interpretation of the standard create two issues: 
under-criminalization of legitimate forms of sex trafficking and 
over-criminalization of non-trafficking behavior. Part IV 
articulates a solution by presenting a revised list of factors that 
courts should consider when determining whether a defendant 
had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” a victim. For purposes 
of this Note, traffickers are referred to in masculine pronouns 
and victims are referred to in feminine pronouns. However, this 
Note recognizes that women can be, and are, perpetrators of 
trafficking, while men and boys can be victims of sex 
trafficking.53 
II. What Is a “Reasonable Opportunity to Observe?” 
Three cases in the past six years “teed up future litigation 
over the quantum of evidence sufficient to trigger” a “reasonable 
 
 50. 702 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 51. 820 F.3d 809 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 52. 822 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 53. See UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, UNITED 
NATIONS (2014), https://perma.cc/PS2X-3R4M (PDF) (stating that over thirty 
percent of convicted traffickers between 2010 and 2012 were women) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Michelle Lillie, Invisible 
Men: Male Victims of Sex Trafficking, HUMAN TRAFFICKING SEARCH (2014), 
https://perma.cc/PCF7-FK5K (last visited Jan. 31, 2020) (stating that while 
women comprise the majority of detected sex trafficking victims, men are the 
most overlooked victims of sex trafficking) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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opportunity to observe” conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c).54 
In 2012, the Second Circuit affirmed a child sex trafficking 
conviction in United States v. Robinson, in which the defendant 
sold his apparently consenting seventeen-year-old girlfriend to 
multiple customers for commercial sex.55 The teen dropped out 
of high school and became an exotic dancer and prostitute.56 She 
testified that she routinely told her clients and friends, 
including the defendant, that she was nineteen.57 She insisted 
that the defendant was her boyfriend, rather than her pimp, and 
that he did not facilitate her line of work.58 Nevertheless, in a 
special verdict form, the jury explicitly found that the defendant 
had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim and the 
Second Circuit affirmed the verdict.59 
In 2016, the Fifth Circuit also affirmed a child sex 
trafficking conviction in United States v. Copeland which 
involved two men engaged in a traditional pimping scheme.60 
The victim, T.J., had run away from her home in San Antonio, 
Texas.61 While at a bus stop, she met Marcus Wright—Malcolm 
Copeland’s codefendant—who recruited and convinced her to 
prostitute.62 The victim told Wright that she was fifteen and he 
advised her to tell everyone that she was eighteen.63 It is not 
clear whether Wright informed his partner Copeland of the 
victim’s true age.64 Copeland later posted photographs of T.J. on 
 
 54. Richmond, supra note 36, at 308, 357. 
 55. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 35 (“[H]e was causing her to engage in 
commercial sex acts as a minor.”). 
 56. See id. at 27 (explaining that Jane Doe was arrested several times for 
prostitution after dropping out of high school). 
 57. See id. (explaining Jane Doe’s testimony that she told “everybody” 
that she was nineteen). 
 58. See id. (stating that Jane Doe claimed that the defendant lived off her 
prostitution income but that he in no way facilitated her line of work). 
 59. See id. at 29 (providing that the jury returned a special verdict finding 
that Robinson had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” Jane Doe). 
 60. See Copeland, 820 F.3d at 811 (stating that Copeland and his 
codefendant ran an escort service). 
 61. See id. at 810 (stating that T.J. was a runaway). 
 62. See id. (describing how Wright advised the victim to lie about her 
name and age and introduced her to the codefendants, one of whom explained 
that she would be having sex with different men for money). 
 63. See id. (“Wright told her to tell everyone that she was eighteen and 
that her name was Barbie.”). 
 64. See id. (stating only that the victim revealed her age to Wright). 
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Backpage.com65—an advertising website since shut down by the 
government due to its promotion of sex trafficking.66 Wright 
gave T.J. a cellphone through which customers contacted her.67 
He or Copeland then transported her to meet customers.68 In 
response to a possible missing person report, police officers were 
dispatched to a motel where they found T.J.69 Copeland was 
convicted of sex trafficking children under 18 U.S.C. § 159170 
and the Fifth Circuit upheld his conviction, rejecting his 
argument that the statute does not impose strict liability and 
the judge should not have instructed the jury to convict upon a 
finding of a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim 
alone.71 
Finally, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction of 
Raymond R. Valas in 2016.72 Valas, a former Army Lieutenant 
Colonel, contacted T.J., the victim from Copeland, through a 
Backpage.com advertisement.73 He admitted that he met the 
victim at his hotel room on two different nights,74 but claimed 
 
 65. See id. (stating that the codefendants advertised the prostitutes on 
Backpage.com). 
 66. See Taylor Goebel, Human Trafficking ‘Hub’ Backpage Is Long Gone, 
but the Problem Still Remains, USA TODAY (Feb. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc
/5FRW-BH7T (last visited Jan. 26, 2020) (explaining that the website was 
involved in three-quarters of child trafficking reports received by the National 
Center for Missing and Exploited Children between 2013 and 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 67. See United States v. Copeland, 820 F.3d 809, 811 (5th Cir. 2016) (“T.J. 
received calls from potential clients on a cell phone provided by Wright.”). 
 68. See id. (“Some combination of Copeland, Wright and Doak would 
transport T.J. to the prearranged location of her sexual assaults.”). 
 69. See id. at 810 (explaining that police officers found T.J. in a Motel 6 
room in San Antonio, Texas). 
 70. See id. at 811 (providing that the jury convicted Copeland of two 
counts of sex trafficking and the court sentenced him to 216 months in prison 
and twenty years of supervised release). 
 71. See id. (rejecting Copeland’s arguments that 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) does 
not impose strict liability and is an unconstitutional provision). 
 72. See United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 248 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(rejecting Valas’s argument regarding the statute’s requisite mens rea and 
affirming his conviction). 
 73. See id. at 235 (describing the victim’s testimony that she received 
online messages from Valas about meeting him at a hotel). 
 74. See id. (“Valas admitted to the jury that he met with T.J. at his hotel 
room briefly on two different nights . . . .”). 
942 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2020) 
he was interviewing her as part of his research fellowship at 
Syracuse University, in which he was studying Salvadoran gang 
activity and sex trafficking.75 He maintained that he and T.J. 
first interacted during a thirty-second conversation at his hotel 
door76 and then spoke for fifteen minutes the following day.77 
Through his own volition, he sought and passed a 
privately-administered polygraph test in which he repeatedly 
denied having sex with T.J.78 The judge found the test legally 
unreliable and it was not introduced into evidence.79 T.J. denied 
participating in any research interview and testified that Valas 
paid her $150 on both nights to engage in commercial sex.80 
Phone records showed that Valas and T.J. spoke on the phone 
eighteen times and texted four times before the second 
interaction the following day.81 Valas based his appeal on seven 
arguments, one of which maintained that the statute does not 
allow a conviction based solely on a “reasonable opportunity to 
observe” the victim.82 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument 
and affirmed his conviction.83  
 
 75. See Jeremy Blackman, National Guard Commander Disputes Texas 
Sex Trafficking Claim, CONCORD MONITOR (Nov. 7, 2014 1:39:08 AM), https://
perma.cc/7FHR-NL3G (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (discussing Valas’s 
enrollment in a research fellowship) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); see also Valas, 822 F.3d at 242 (stating that Valas testified that he 
called T.J. as part of his independent and unofficial scholarly research on 
prostitution). 
 76. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 235 (explaining Valas’s testimony that he met 
the victim at the hotel room door for less than thirty seconds on August 26, 
2013). 
 77. See id. (explaining Valas’s testimony that he spoke with the victim on 
August 27, 2013 for no more than fifteen minutes as part of his independent 
research project). 
 78. See Blackman, supra note 75 (“Valas later passed a polygraph test in 
which he was repeatedly asked whether he had sex with the girl . . . .”). 
 79. See id. (“[T]he test was unsolicited and therefore legally unreliable.”). 
 80. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 235 (explaining testimony that Valas gave the 
victim $150 each day, which was her price for thirty minutes of sexual 
services). 
 81. See id. (discussing the multiple phone calls and text messages 
between Valas and the victim that occurred over the course of two days). 
 82. See id. (describing Valas’s argument that “the district court 
improperly instructed the jury on § 1591’s scienter requirement regarding the 
victim’s age, resulting in a conviction based on a lower mental state than 
authorized by the statute”). 
 83. See id. (affirming Valas’s conviction). 
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Though the cases of Robinson, Copeland, and Valas 
involved vastly different facts, the courts relied upon 
surprisingly similar factors in affirming each conviction, as this 
section will demonstrate. 
A. Recent Trends: Robinson, Copeland, and Valas 
Each court highlighted several factors that were relevant to 
the question of whether the evidence showed a “reasonable 
opportunity to observe” a child sex trafficking victim.84 In 
affirming Robinson’s conviction, the Second Circuit did not 
explicitly state the requisite evidence to prove the standard, but 
it noted several relevant factors.85 It repeatedly discussed the 
victim’s youthful appearance and demeanor,86 despite holding 
that the standard required strict liability and thus that the 
defendant need not be aware of the victim’s age.87 It stated that 
because the victim appeared youthful, “her status as a minor 
would have been obvious” to any observer,88 implying that the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s observation opportunity 
depends in part on whether the victim’s demeanor and 
appearance match her true age. The court also emphasized the 
 
 84. See id. at 240–41 (discussing the defendant’s knowledge of the signs 
of human trafficking, prior involvement in prostitution schemes, and other 
factors); see also United States v. Copeland, 820 F.3d 809, 810–11 (5th Cir. 
2016) (discussing the recruitment of the victim, transportation of victim, 
knowledge of victim’s age, and other factors); United States v. Robinson, 702 
F.3d 22, 27–28, 36 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing the underage social network of 
the victim, the defendant’s access to the victim’s finances, the defendant’s 
history of prostitution involvement, and other factors). 
 85. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 35–36 (explaining the court’s rejection of 
the defendant’s evidentiary challenges regarding the “reasonable opportunity 
to observe” provision). 
 86. See id. at 35 
[T]he jury had an opportunity to observe Jane Doe testify at trial, 
when she was nineteen years old, and also to view several 
photographs of Jane Doe taken before she turned eighteen . . . [and] 
that Jane Doe’s appearance and demeanor were such that her 
status as a minor would have been obvious to someone intimately 
involved in her life. 
 87. See id. at 26 (“This provision, when applicable, imposes strict liability 
with regard to the defendant’s awareness of the victim’s age, thus relieving 
the government’s usual burden to prove knowledge or reckless disregard of the 
victim’s underage status under § 1591(a).”). 
 88. Id. at 35. 
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significance of the underage social network of the victim and 
noted that because Robinson met the victim through his high 
school-aged sister, he was likely aware of the victim’s age.89  
Additionally, the court discussed as relevant factors the 
length of the two-and-a-half-year relationship between 
Robinson and the victim,90 as well as the intimate nature of the 
relationship.91 Moreover, it noted Robinson’s coercive behavior, 
as the evidence showed that he regularly used the victim’s sex 
work profits for himself92 and repeatedly threatened and 
pressured her into prostituting on certain nights.93 Finally, the 
court highlighted Robinson’s history of pimping,94 which could 
make him more knowledgeable of the signs of human trafficking 
and therefore require a shorter period of time necessary to 
constitute a “reasonable opportunity to observe.”95 
Like the Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit implied certain 
relevant factors of a “reasonable opportunity to observe” in 
United States v. Copeland.96 It discussed the fact that Copeland 
 
 89. See id. at 36 (stating that a reasonable jury could find that Robinson 
was aware of the victim’s age, and thus had a “reasonable opportunity to 
observe” the victim, “especially given that their relationship began before Jane 
Doe dropped out of high school during her junior year”). 
 90. See id. at 35 (quoting the government’s position that “it would strain 
credulity to suggest that someone who had known her as long and as 
intimately as Robinson would not have learned her true age”). 
 91. See id. at 35–36 (“A reasonable jury could conclude that Robinson’s 
ability to personally observe his underage victim, especially given their 
intimate relationship, put him on notice of an unjustifiably high risk that she 
was underage.”). 
 92. See id. at 28 (discussing a tape in which Robinson admitted to using 
the victim’s profits). 
 93. See id. at 38 
A reasonable juror, for example, could conclude that Robinson 
sounded a lot more like Jane Doe’s pimp than her “boyfriend,” 
“lover,” or “best friend,” when he threatened that, if she did not have 
the “f***ing money,” he would “beat the sh**’ out of [her] stupid 
a** . . . [and] throw [her] in a f***ing garbage can and let everybody 
know [she] ain’t sh**.” 
 94. See id. at 28 (explaining a tape played at trial that portrayed 
Robinson’s involvement and promotion of prostitution in the past). 
 95. Compare id. (describing Robinson’s admission of his history with 
pimping), with United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 241 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(concluding that Valas’s annual employment training about human trafficking 
made it more likely that he was aware of the “signs, dangers, and horrors” of 
trafficking). 
 96. 820 F.3d 809 (5th Cir. 2016). 
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was part of an operation that actively recruited the victim for 
prostitution,97 took photographs of her,98 and used 
Backpage.com to advertise her for commercial sex.99 The most 
important factor seemed to be that Copeland physically 
interacted with the victim when he transported her to meet 
sex-buyers.100 Moreover, like the Robinson court, the Copeland 
court implied that knowledge of the victim’s age could create a 
“reasonable opportunity” by noting that the victim told the 
codefendant that she was fifteen, and thus, Copeland might 
have been aware of her age.101 Though the statute forbids lack 
of knowledge of a victim’s age as a defense,102 a victim revealing 
her age to a defendant would certainly increase the 
reasonableness of any opportunity to observe her.  
Additionally, similar to the Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit 
emphasized Copeland’s multiple interactions with sex 
trafficking victims, as he had been indicted for trafficking 
another minor.103 His other experiences could have made him 
more aware of the signs of human trafficking, which would 
shorten the period of time necessary for him to have a 
“reasonable opportunity to observe” a trafficking victim.104 
Finally, the court noted the length and coercive nature of the 
interaction and observation opportunity by explaining that for 
five days, Copeland ordered the victim to perform sexual acts 
 
 97. See id. at 810 (noting that Copeland assisted his codefendants with 
recruiting and training potential prostitutes). 
 98. See id. (“Copeland . . . had [the codefendant] take pictures of T.J. for 
her internet profile.”). 
 99. See id. (stating that Copeland and his codefendants posted pictures 
of the prostitutes to Backpage.com). 
 100. See id. at 811 (noting that Copeland transported the victim to various 
hotels and directed her to perform sexual acts for money). 
 101. Compare United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 35–36 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“Jane Doe’s appearance and demeanor were such that her status as a minor 
would have been obvious. . . .”), with Copeland, 820 F.3d at 810 (stating that 
the victim told Copeland’s codefendant that she was fifteen years old). 
 102. See Copeland, 820 F.3d at 813 (providing that the statute imposes 
strict liability). 
 103. Compare id. at 811 (explaining that Copeland’s indictment referenced 
T.J. and another minor victim), with Robinson, 702 F.3d at 28 (describing 
Robinson’s promotion of prostitution in prior instances). 
 104. Compare Copeland, 820 F.3d at 810 (describing Copeland’s prior 
involvement with recruiting and training prostitutes), with Valas, 822 F.3d at 
241 (“He was trained on human trafficking: its signs, dangers, and horrors.”). 
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for money and transported her to the “prearranged location[s] of 
her sexual assaults.”105 
The Fifth Circuit relied on similar factors in United States 
v. Valas.106 Like the other two courts, the Valas court 
emphasized the defendant’s prior involvement with human 
trafficking107—but this time in a very different way. Unlike 
Robinson and Copeland, whose experiences as pimps exposed 
them to human trafficking victims,108 Valas’s prior involvement 
with trafficking consisted only of general knowledge of the 
industry.109 The court stated that Valas had attended training 
sessions at his place of employment that centered on recognizing 
signs of human trafficking and, thus, he knew “its signs, 
dangers, and horrors.”110 Moreover, Valas, like Robinson111 and 
Copeland,112 had prior experience with the adult prostitution 
industry.113 He had previously interacted with and possibly had 
sex with other prostitutes whom he contacted on 
Backpage.com.114 Finally, the Valas court noted the defendant’s 
 
 105. See Copeland, 820 F.3d at 811 (“For five days in 2013, T.J. was 
directed by Copeland . . . to perform sexual acts for money.”). 
 106. 822 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 107. See id. at 241 (describing the training Valas attended). 
 108. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 28 (noting Robinson’s prior experience as a 
pimp); see also United States v. Copeland, 820 F.3d 809, 810 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(stating that Copeland was part of an operation that recruited multiple 
prostitutes). 
 109. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 241 (stating that the defendant participated in 
annual Department of Defense training on human trafficking). 
 110. See id. (concluding that the PowerPoint slides cast doubt on Valas’s 
defense because “he was trained on human trafficking: its signs, dangers, and 
horrors”). 
 111. See United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(describing Robinson’s history of pimping). 
 112. See Copeland, 820 F.3d at 810 (stating that Copeland recruited and 
trained other prostitutes). 
 113. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 240 (describing evidence of messages between 
Valas and six other prostitutes on Backpage.com). 
 114. See id. (discussing evidence that Valas had contacted at least six 
other women on Backpage.com both before and after he met T.J.). 
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interaction with the victim for between fifteen and sixty 
minutes115 and the sexual nature of their encounter.116  
An analysis of these three cases reveals that the Second and 
Fifth Circuits utilize similar factors to determine whether a 
defendant had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” a child sex 
trafficking victim. The following subsection lists the combined 
criteria these courts have relied on in their analyses of the 
requisite evidence to obtain a § 1591(c) conviction. This 
predictive list sheds light on how the Second and Fifth Circuits, 
and potentially other Circuits and lower courts, approach § 
1591(c) cases.  
B. The Current Interpretation: Necessary Factors to Constitute 
a “Reasonable Opportunity to Observe” 
The Robinson, Copeland, and Valas courts focused on 
defendants engaged in starkly different behaviors. Robinson’s 
trafficking act involved his three-year romantic yet coercive 
relationship with his victim;117 Copeland’s resembled a more 
traditional pimping operation;118 and Valas’s was based on two 
thirty-minute interactions in a hotel room.119 Yet, the cases 
suggest that appellate courts will affirm a “reasonable 
opportunity to observe” conviction if some combination of the 
following factors is present: 
1. A defendant’s prior involvement with prostitutes or 
knowledge of signs of human trafficking;120 
 
 115. See id. at 235 (comparing Valas’s assertion that he spent a total of 
fifteen minutes with the victim against her assertion that the time amounted 
to one hour). 
 116. See id. (stating that the jury found that Valas engaged in commercial 
sex acts with the victim). 
 117. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 35, 38 (describing evidence that Robinson 
threatened and used force against Jane Doe over the course of three years). 
 118. See United States v. Copeland, 820 F.3d 809, 810–11 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(describing Copeland’s role in recruiting and training prostitutes for a 
multi-victim operation). 
 119. See United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(describing Valas’s two interactions with the victim in his hotel room). 
 120. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 28 (noting Robinson’s admission of his 
involvement with pimping on a previous occasion); see also Copeland, 820 F.3d 
at 810 (stating that Copeland was part of an operation that recruited 
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2. A defendant’s physical interaction with a victim;121 
3. At least a one-hour interaction between a defendant 
and victim;122 
4. A relationship or established social connection 
between a defendant and victim;123 
5. A victim’s youthful demeanor;124 
6. A victim’s disclosure of minor status;125  
7. A victim’s deceitfulness about her age;126 
8. A defendant’s knowledge of the background or 
underage social network of a victim;127 and 
9. A defendant’s participation in the recruitment or 
advertisement of a victim’s services.128 
 
prostitutes); Valas, 822 F.3d at 240–41 (concluding that Valas had contacted 
multiple prostitutes on Backpage.com and received annual anti-trafficking 
training at his work). 
 121. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 27, 35 (explaining that Robinson and the 
victim physically and intimately interacted over the course of almost three 
years); see also Copeland, 820 F.3d at 811 (discussing Copeland’s physical 
interaction with the victim when he transported her to meet sex-buyers); 
Valas, 822 F.3d at 235, 41 (stating that Valas spent time with the victim in 
his hotel room). 
 122. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 235 (explaining that the victim twice received 
$150, which was the price for thirty minutes of her services); see also Copeland, 
820 F.3d at 811 (noting that Copeland was with the victim for five days); 
Robinson, 702 F.3d at 27, 35 (stating that the defendant and victim interacted 
for almost three years). 
 123. See United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 35 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating 
that Robinson lived with the victim, which would have put him on notice of 
her status as a minor); see also Valas, 822 F.3d at 235 (stating that Valas spoke 
on the phone with the victim eighteen times). 
 124. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 35–36 (“Jane Doe’s appearance and 
demeanor were such that her status as a minor would have been 
obvious . . . .”). 
 125. See Copeland, 820 F.3d at 810 (“T.J. told Wright she was fifteen years 
old . . . .”). 
 126. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 35 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that Jane Doe 
told “everybody” that she was nineteen); see also Copeland, 820 F.3d at 810 
(noting that the codefendant told the victim to lie about her age); Valas, 822 
F.3d at 241 (stating that the victim “billed herself” as nineteen years old). 
 127. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 36 (explaining that the defendant likely 
knew the victim’s minor status because they met through her sister while the 
victim was in high school); see also Valas, 822 F.3d at 241 (stating that the 
victim never discussed her background with Valas); Copeland, 820 F.3d at 810 
(explaining that the victim discussed her minor status with the codefendant). 
 128. See Copeland, 820 F.3d at 810 (discussing Copeland’s involvement in 
recruiting, taking pictures, and advertising the victim on Backpage.com). 
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This factor list displays the current interpretation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1591(c)’s “reasonable opportunity to observe” standard. 
Nevertheless, as the following section illustrates, this 
interpretation is inherently flawed and results in various 
criminal enforcement issues by straying from Congress’s 
original intent for the statute.  
III. A Flawed Factor List: Issues Created by the Current 
Interpretation 
The utility of the current interpretation of what constitutes 
a “reasonable opportunity to observe” is limited and could cause 
confusion among lower courts because it both 
under-criminalizes and over-criminalizes the offense of sex 
trafficking children. 
A. Under-Criminalization 
Under the current factor list of the interpretation of  
§ 1591(c), courts emphasize the importance of a defendant’s 
physical interaction with a victim.129 The Copeland court, for 
example, highlighted the defendant’s physical interaction with 
the victim when he transported her to meet sex-buyers.130 The 
Valas court noted that the defendant spent thirty minutes with 
the victim in his hotel room on two separate days.131 The 
Robinson court emphasized the intimate nature of the 
defendant’s and victim’s physical interactions over a 
two-and-a-half year period.132 In addition, the Second Circuit 
recently upheld jury instructions providing that the defendant 
 
 129. See supra Part II.B (labeling physical interaction as a relevant factor 
under the current interpretation of the standard). 
 130. See United States v. Copeland, 820 F.3d 809, 811 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(stating that Copeland transported the victim to the locations where she was 
sexually assaulted). 
 131. See United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(providing the victim’s testimony that Valas paid her twice for thirty minutes 
of sexual services). 
 132. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 35–36 (stating that the physically intimate 
relationship provided a reasonable opportunity for Robinson to observe the 
victim). 
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had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim if he had a 
“face-to-face interaction” with her.133  
The emphasis on a physical interaction, however, fails to 
achieve Congress’s statutory intent to criminalize a broad range 
of sex trafficking conduct.134 Congress stated that its purpose for 
passing the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act 
of 2000 was to combat the following issues: 
Existing legislation and law enforcement in the United 
States and other countries are inadequate to deter 
trafficking and bring traffickers to justice, failing to reflect 
the gravity of the offenses involved. No comprehensive law 
exists in the United States that penalizes the range of 
offenses involved in the trafficking scheme. Instead, even the 
most brutal instances of trafficking in the sex industry are 
often punished under laws that also apply to lesser offenses, 
so that traffickers typically escape deserved punishment.135 
When Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 1591 in 2015, it further 
stated that its purpose was to “clarify the range of conduct 
punished as sex trafficking” in order to thwart the concern that 
traffickers were receiving lenient sentences.136 
Nevertheless, requiring a physical interaction under the 
current interpretation of a “reasonable opportunity to 
observe”137 dilutes punishment of “the most brutal instances of 
trafficking.”138 It prevents the application of the statute to 
modern forms of trafficking that do not involve physical 
interactions, such as webcam child sex trafficking139—the 
 
 133. See United States v. Corley, 679 F. App’x 1, 5–6 (2d Cir. 2017) (noting 
jury instructions that equated a “face-to-face interaction” with a “reasonable 
opportunity to observe”). 
 134. See TVPA of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 112, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) (criminalizing those who recruit, entice, harbor, transport, 
provide, or obtain a sex trafficking victim). 
 135. Id. § 102(b)(14). 
 136. See Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, 
§ 108(c), 129 Stat. 227 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) [hereinafter JVTA of 2015] 
(describing amendments that serve to reduce demand for sex trafficking). 
 137. See supra Part II.B (listing a defendant’s physical interaction with a 
victim as a relevant factor in assessing whether he had a “reasonable 
opportunity to observe” her). 
 138. TVPA of 2000 § 112. 
 139. See Sunshine de Leon, Cyber-Sex Trafficking: A 21st Century Scourge, 
CNN (Jul. 18, 2013) https://perma.cc/MF44-X6L3 (last visited Jan. 27, 2020) 
(describing a cyber form of sex trafficking in which most victims are recruited 
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development of which has been a recent, but widespread 
addition to the human trafficking industry.140  
Webcam child sex trafficking involves perpetrators seeking 
live, virtual sex shows from children who are often located 
thousands of miles away in another country.141 A computer 
screen separates perpetrators from their victims, preventing 
any type of physical interaction.142 Parents and relatives are 
some of the most common sources of supply in this trafficking 
scheme, as they create the shows by pressuring their children to 
perform sexual acts or abusing the children on camera 
themselves.143 However, the overwhelming demand for these 
sex shows fuels the industry.144 According to the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, 750,000 predators are online at any given time 
seeking abusive livestreamed shows.145  
Investigating online buyers of webcam child sex shows 
proves difficult for law enforcement officers.146 Perpetrators are 
increasingly gravitating towards this form of trafficking 
because of its enhanced sense of anonymity and reduced risk of 
detection compared with physically traveling to a location to 
meet and exploit a child.147 As one journalist noted, “[C]yber-sex 
 
by friends or family members to perform sex shows on the internet) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 140. See id. (describing webcam sex trafficking and the “newest but not 
less sinister world of sexual exploitation”). 
 141. See, e.g., id. (describing a fourteen-year-old Filipina cyber-sex 
trafficking victim who performed online shows for men around the world). 
 142. See id. (“Anyone who has a computer, internet and a Web cam can be 
in business.”). 
 143. See Martha Mendoza, AP Exclusive: Big Child Webcam Sex Bust 
Reveals Rising Abuse, AP NEWS (May 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/G9XR-XPXE 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2020) (explaining how impoverished parents and 
relatives exploit their children on the internet for easy money) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 144. See id. (stating that the rapid expansion of the crime is an epidemic). 
 145. See id. (“[A]t any given moment, 750,000 child predators are online.”). 
 146. See id. (explaining the difficulties in investigating webcam sex 
tourism due to the fact that “pedophiles now operate in virtual anonymity”); 
see also de Leon, supra note 139 (“[T]he private nature of the technology allows 
the crime to take place in a venue that law enforcement can’t easily 
access— and that makes it harder to gather evidence against perpetrators.”). 
 147. See Joshua T. Carback, Cybersex Trafficking: Toward a More Effective 
Prosecutorial Response, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 26 (2018) (“The use of a webcam 
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trafficking appears to be the perfect 21st century crime. 
Technology has made it easier to access and exploit the 
vulnerable, operate illegal activities across borders and more 
difficult to discover the identities of those who are behind the 
crime.”148 
To avoid detection, perpetrators seek and view sex shows 
through encrypted livestreams on the dark web.149 They pay 
victims with bitcoin, untraceable debit cards, or wire transfers 
through Western Union under false names.150 They livestream 
the shows to avoid storing incriminating evidence on clouds or 
hard drives.151 Even when law enforcement officers detect 
suspicious behavior, they have difficulty gathering proof of the 
crime due to the private nature of the video shows152—predators 
and victims usually “meet” in a chat room before deciding to 
take their conversation to a private video stream.153  
The purported anonymity of seeking these shows online 
attracts predators with particularly heinous sexual fantasies.154 
According to the anti-trafficking organization International 
Justice Mission, “The more abusive the show, the more the 
customer pays.”155 Let’s take a look at one predator who 
capitalized on this twisted market. Fleeing multimillion-dollar 
fraud allegations, Australian national Peter Scully moved to the 
 
as a modality to sell sexual exploitation for the gratification of foreign buyers 
confers purchasers with a greater level of anonymity, and therefore a lesser 
degree of risk than physically traveling abroad to exploit children in person.”). 
 148. De Leon, supra note 139. 
 149. See Mendoza, supra note 143 (explaining perpetrators’ use of 
livestreams to enhance virtual anonymity). 
 150. See id. (stating that the use of smart phones and wi-fi have led to an 
expansion of webcam sex trafficking because predators now use money 
transfer services and virtual payment methods). 
 151. See id. (“By livestreaming, they bypass digital markers law 
enforcement embeds in illegal content to catch people downloading, sharing or 
saving child pornography on computers or in the Cloud.”). 
 152. See id. (“Once isolated, pedophiles now operate with virtual 
anonymity . . . .”). 
 153. See id. (discussing the use of chat room groups and online forums to 
buy and sell child sex shows). 
 154. See Cybersex Trafficking, IJM, https://perma.cc/P7FW-DNLT (PDF) 
(explaining how predators search online for shows depicting abuse of young 
children—some even under the age of two). 
 155. Id. 
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Philippines in 2011.156 Over the next four years, Scully recorded 
and live streamed films in which he violently raped and abused 
young Filipina girls—all at the request of online pedophiles.157 
In one film, two young girls are seen digging their own graves 
before Scully rapes and strangles them.158 One of these girls was 
later found buried underneath his house.159 Another film shows 
Scully brutally sexually abusing an eighteen-month-old 
infant.160 He dubbed the film Daisy’s Destruction and sold it on 
the dark web to thousands of predators worldwide, receiving as 
much as $10,000 per individual view.161 While Scully was 
 
 156. See Tammy Mills, Chris Vedelago & Lindsay Murdoch, Alleged 
Paedophile Peter Gerard Scully Fled a Sordid Past in Melbourne, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (Mar. 6, 2015 4:30 PM), https://perma.cc/V9S7-WVDC (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2020) (stating that Scully fled Australia to the Philippines 
following his involvement in a property scheme that defrauded over twenty 
investors of $2.68 million) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 157. See Australian Peter Scully Given Life Sentence for Human 
Trafficking, Rape in Philippines, Reports Say, ABC (Jun. 13, 2018 8:55 PM), 
https://perma.cc/UW6J-FZSX (last visited Feb. 7, 2019) (explaining Scully’s 
production of violent child pornography films) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also Mills, Vedelago & Murdoch, supra note 156 
(“Police allege Scully, who used the aliases of Peter Ridell and Peter Russell, 
orchestrated a scheme where paedophiles paid to live steam videos of children 
as young as one being tortured and sexually abused as per their requests.”). 
 158. See Samuel Osborne, Philippines Signals It Wants to Bring Back 
Death Penalty Just So It Can Execute Australian Alleged Paedophile, 
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/3WWG-L94T (last visited Jan. 
22, 2020) (describing the abuse Scully inflicted on various girls) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 159. See Australian Peter Scully Given Life Sentence for Human 
Trafficking, Rape in Philippines, Reports Say, supra note 157 (stating that one 
victim’s skeleton was discovered buried under a house that Scully had rented). 
 160. See id. (describing Scully’s abuses). 
 161. See Rob Waugh, What Is Daisy’s Destruction? ‘Snuff Film’ Urban 
Legend Actually Exists, METRO (Sept. 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/NYJ9-53XW 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2020) (explaining the demand for the video around the 
world) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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convicted of human trafficking in 2018,162 individuals continue 
to trade his film online and avoid law enforcement detection.163  
Though Scully’s actions were some of the most horrific and 
sadistic instances of child abuse,164 thousands of predators like 
him continue to fulfill customers’ requests for webcam child sex 
shows.165 The United States does not criminalize webcam or 
cybersex trafficking as a federal offense.166 Instead, it 
criminalizes these acts under child pornography, online 
solicitation, or corruption of children laws,167 which is precisely 
what Congress intended to avoid.168 While penalties for 
alternative offenses such as child pornography can be severe,169 
Congress explicitly enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1591 to ensure that 
traffickers were not punished under lesser offenses.170 It also 
made clear that its purpose was to criminalize a wide array of 
conduct because no law existed at the time that covered the 
range of offenses involved in sex trafficking.171 It included a 
 
 162. See Candace Sutton, Infamous Pedophile Smiles as He Gets Life in 
Prison, N.Y. POST (June 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/PVC6-9EYF (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2020) (explaining that Scully was found guilty of human trafficking 
in a Philippines court and still faced up to sixty charges for murder, torture, 
and abuse) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 163. See Australian Peter Scully Given Life Sentence for Human 
Trafficking, Rape in Philippines, Reports Say, supra note 157 (describing the 
upload of the video to the internet and its widespread sales). 
 164. See Osborne, supra note 158 (stating that Scully’s actions were so 
depraved that prosecutors and authorities advocated for the Philippines to 
reintroduce the death penalty). 
 165. See Mendoza, supra note 143 (stating that at any given time, there 
are 750,000 child predators online). 
 166. See Bart W. Schermer et. al., Legal Aspects of Sweetie 2.0, LEIDEN U. 
(Oct. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/W2ZJ-4SQX (PDF) (noting the absence of 
webcam sex trafficking laws in various countries, including the United States). 
 167. See id. (providing a chart of the laws that United States federal courts 
apply to webcam sex trafficking). 
 168. See TVPA of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(b)(14), 114 Stat. 1464 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) (enacting the statute because “[n]o 
comprehensive law exists in the United States that penalizes the range of 
offenses involved in the trafficking scheme”). 
 169. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) (2018) (providing a penalty of up to forty 
years imprisonment for certain child pornography offenses). 
 170. See TVPA of 2000 § 102(b)(14) (“[T]he most brutal instances of 
trafficking in the sex industry are often punished under laws that also apply 
to lesser offenses, so that traffickers typically escape deserved punishment.”). 
 171. See id. (“No comprehensive law exists in the United States that 
penalizes the range of offenses involved in the trafficking scheme.”). 
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variety of activities under the term “sex trafficking” in order to 
acknowledge that sex trafficking is not a single, simple action, 
but is rather manifest in a plethora of complex and constantly 
changing forms.172 Nevertheless, courts have interpreted the 
definition to rely heavily on the presence of a physical 
interaction between the defendant and victim,173 which prevents 
the statute from adapting to developments in technology. 
Webcam sex trafficking instances were rare, if not nonexistent, 
when Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) in 2000,174 but as 
technology advances, human trafficking only becomes more 
complicated.175 The progression of this crime into more 
sophisticated realms should not prevent it from being included 
in “the range of conduct punished as sex trafficking.”176  
Not only does the current interpretation of the statute allow 
for under-criminalization of emerging forms of sex trafficking, 
but it also over-criminalizes actions that fall outside of 
Congress’s definition of sex trafficking. Though Congress 
intended to criminalize a comprehensive range of offenses 
involved in the trafficking scheme,177 there are certain 
actions— though separate criminal offenses in themselves—that 
should not be encompassed in the statutory definition of child 
sex trafficking. Those actions are discussed in the following 
subsection. 
B. Over-Criminalization 
The current interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), outlined 
in the factor list in Part II.B, problematically considers a 
 
 172. See, e.g., What Is Modern Slavery?, ANTI-SLAVERY INT’L., https://
perma.cc/CP69-PP5W (last visited Jan. 27, 2020) (describing the various forms 
of human trafficking, such as child slavery, forced marriage, and bonded labor) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 173. See supra Part II.B (describing how courts assess a physical 
interaction between the victim and defendant). 
 174. See Mendoza, supra note 143 (stating that the first high-profile 
international case of webcam sex trafficking was reported in 2011). 
 175. See id. (explaining how the proliferation of smart phones and the 
internet paved the way for the expansion of cyber trafficking crimes). 
 176. JVTA of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 108(c), 129 Stat. 227 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1591). 
 177. See TVPA of 2000 § 102(b)(14) (providing Congress’s intent to create 
a comprehensive law that criminalizes a broad range of trafficking offenses). 
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relationship or established social connection between a 
defendant and victim as well as a defendant’s knowledge of 
signs of human trafficking. The combination of these factors 
paves the way for an over-criminalization of individuals to 
whom Congress did not intend the statute to apply.178 
1. Violation of Legislative Intent 
Courts’ current interpretations of the “reasonable 
opportunity to observe” standard allows for convictions of people 
who are not actually “trafficking children” according to 
Congress’s original intent for the statute.179 In passing the child 
sex trafficking statute, Congress set out to “combat trafficking 
in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose 
victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just 
and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their 
victims.”180 It further stated: 
It is the sense of Congress that . . . a sex trafficker [is] a 
person who “knowingly . . . recruits, entices, harbors, 
transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a 
person . . . knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that 
means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion . . . or any 
combination of such means will be used to cause the person 
to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not 
attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in 
a commercial sex act.”181 
 According to the stated legislative intent, sex trafficking 
encompasses a wide variety of criminal activities.182 Those who 
engage in the most pervasive forms of sex trafficking would 
unquestionably be categorized as sex traffickers under the 
Act.183 For instance, the definition of “sex trafficker” includes 
persons who lure undocumented populations into the United 
States with false promises of jobs184 because they knowingly 
 
 178. See id. § 102(a) (enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1591 in order to combat 
trafficking in persons, slavery, and involuntary servitude). 
 179. See id. § 102(b) (explaining the definition of human trafficking). 
 180. Id. § 102(a). 
 181. JVTA of 2015 § 108 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1591). 
 182. See id. (criminalizing seven different actions). 
 183. See id. (providing that those who knowingly cause another person to 
engage in a commercial sex act are sex traffickers). 
 184. See What Is Modern Slavery?, supra note 172 (stating that traffickers 
will often promise a fake new job to someone living in poverty). 
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recruit, entice, harbor, and transport the victims.185 Moreover, 
Congress would certainly deem as sex traffickers parents who 
sell their child’s virginity,186 as well as business owners who 
exploit undocumented employees to sell sex,187 and “financial 
lenders” who offer impoverished individuals loans with 
exorbitant interest rates that they then force the borrowers to 
pay off through prostitution.188 The statute’s definition of a sex 
trafficker also encompasses traditional pimps who engage in 
complex, manipulative, and violent tactics to recruit and force 
children to enter the prostitution industry.189  
Nonetheless, despite the broad range of activities covered 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, courts should not allow certain behavior 
to be criminalized under the statute. Importantly, sex 
trafficking children and soliciting a prostitute must be 
recognized as two distinct criminal actions that carry different 
consequences. It is crucial to first understand the difference 
between sex trafficking and prostitution. Only adults can be 
prostitutes, while both adults and children can be sex trafficking 
 
 185. See TVPA of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 112, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) (providing that a sex trafficker is a person who knowingly 
recruits, entices, or transports a victim). 
 186. See Russell Goldman, Utah Mother Tried to Sell Daughter’s Virginity 
for $10,000, Say Cops, ABC NEWS (May 24, 2011), https://perma.cc/EBQ8-
CD6V (last visited Jan. 27, 2020) (explaining that Felicia McClure attempted 
to sell her thirteen-year-old daughter’s virginity against the daughter’s 
wishes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 187. See Human Trafficking—Exploitation of Illegal Aliens, FAIR (Aug. 
2016), https://perma.cc/DZV5-EJNX (last visited Mar. 7, 2020) (“While anyone 
can become a victim of trafficking, illegal aliens are highly vulnerable to being 
trafficked due to a combination of factors, including lack of legal status and 
protections, limited language skills and employment options, poverty and 
immigration-related debts, and social isolation.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 188. See Debt vs. Debt-Bondage: What’s the Difference?, POLARIS BLOG 
(Mar. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/MU6S-ZZTB (last visited Jan. 27, 2020) 
(explaining that traffickers impose unreasonable interest rates on loans, often 
as high as 400%, and convince victims that they must prostitute to pay off the 
debt) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 189. See LINDA SMITH & CINDY COLOMA, RENTING LACY: A STORY OF 
AMERICA’S PROSTITUTED CHILDREN 76 (Shared Hope Int’l ed., 2013) (describing 
how a pimp manipulates child victims). 
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victims.190 Many scholars argue that there is no such thing as a 
“child prostitute” because young children cannot legally consent 
to sex, and thus cannot freely choose to become prostitutes.191 
Adults, on the other hand, can be trafficked into the prostitution 
industry or they can enter it through their own volition.192 
Therefore, though the merits and reasoning behind it can be 
debated,193 a distinction remains between those who sell sex: an 
 
 190. See What’s Wrong with Calling a Child a Prostitute?, SHARED HOPE 
INT’L (Jan. 7, 2010), https://perma.cc/MH5K-U3CA (last visited Jan. 31, 2020) 
(“A child cannot be a prostitute because she/he is a victim of commercial sexual 
exploitation and the federal law defines this child as a victim of sex 
trafficking.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 191. See id. (noting that under federal law, all minors engaged in 
commercial sex acts are classified as trafficking victims); see also Samantha 
Cowan, Why Sex-Trafficked Children Can’t Be Called Prostitutes, TAKE PART 
(Sept. 23, 2015), https://perma.cc/3NJA-479R (last visited Jan. 31, 2020) 
(stating that the term “child prostitute” is “misleading because it suggests 
consent and criminality when none exists”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Malika Saada Saar, There Is No Such Thing as a Child 
Prostitute, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2014), https://perma.cc/K65T-66UJ (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2020) (explaining that because vulnerable children are 
exploited and forced against their will to sell sex, they cannot ever truly 
“choose” to become prostitutes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 192. See Kelly J. Bell, A Feminist’s Argument on How Sex Work Can 
Benefit Women, INQUIRIES J. (2009), https://perma.cc/BRV6-47Y2 (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2020) (explaining the argument that sex work is not always a form of 
violence, but can be a choice for women) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); see also Should Prostitution Be a Normal Profession?, BBC, 
https://perma.cc/A4G3-YJLB (last visited Jan. 31) (detailing an interview with 
a prostitute who said, “I do this on my own choice” because she needed to pay 
rent until she found another job) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). But see Julie Bindel, Most ‘Sex Workers’ Are Modern-Day Slaves, 
SPECTATOR (Aug. 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/43VF-J4Q6 (last visited Jan. 31, 
2020) (“Prostitution is rarely, if ever, a choice.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Natasha Guynes, Sex Work Is Almost Never a Choice, 
MARIECLAIRE (Aug. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/48RS-5UBE (last visited Jan. 
31, 2020) (“The most common words I hear from the women who come to [my 
non-profit organization]: ‘I don’t have a choice.’”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 193. See Bindel, supra note 192 (arguing that women never become 
prostitutes out of true free will because “whatever lobbyists say, women and 
girls in prostitution are overwhelmingly from abusive backgrounds, living in 
poverty, and otherwise marginalised. They are not free or empowered: they 
are abused and trapped”); see also Guynes, supra note 192 (explaining that 
women are pushed into prostitution by poverty and necessity, not by choice or 
a desire to perform sex work); Freddy Hayes, Treat Prostitutes as Victims, Not 
Criminals, DALLAS NEWS (Apr. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/ATR8-NRPA (last 
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adult is typically assumed to be a prostitute unless she indicates 
that she did not willingly choose that line of work, while a child 
is automatically considered a sex trafficking victim due to her 
age.194  
Based on this line of reasoning, this section focuses on men 
who solicit prostitutes—that is, adult sellers of sex. Men who 
solicit prostitutes are not pimps—they are those who purchase 
sexual services from prostitutes.195 This section argues that this 
category of men who have good-faith—albeit illegal—intentions 
to solicit of-age prostitutes are not, and should not, 
automatically be criminalized as child sex traffickers when the 
victim is found to be underage.196  
Recognizing the need to distinguish between soliciting a 
prostitute and trafficking children in no way disregards the 
great harm caused by those who solicit prostitutes. Prostitution 
undoubtedly dehumanizes women and is an inherently 
dangerous industry.197 Prostitutes are exposed to higher 
likelihoods of rape, physical violence, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, and even murder.198 In fact, it is often argued that 
 
visited Jan. 31, 2020) (“There is a misconception that women choose to go into 
prostitution because it is a quick way to make easy money. However, the vast 
majority of these women are forced to engage in prostitution.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 194. See What’s Wrong with Calling a Child a Prostitute?, supra note 190 
(stating that children engaged in commercial sex acts are automatically 
deemed trafficking victims under federal law). 
 195. See John, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2020) (stating 
that a john is “a prostitute’s client”). 
 196. See JVTA of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 108, 129 Stat. 227 (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) (stating that those who purchase sexual acts from 
trafficking victims should be criminalized only if merited by the facts of the 
case). 
 197. See Bureau of Public Affairs, The Link Between Prostitution and Sex 
Trafficking, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 24, 2004), https://perma.cc/NJC3-7SL9 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2020) (“The U.S. Government adopted a strong position 
against legalized prostitution . . . based on evidence that prostitution is 
inherently harmful and dehumanizing, and fuels trafficking in persons, a form 
of modern-day slavery.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 198. See id. (stating the results of a study showing that sixty to seventy 
percent of prostitutes had been raped; seventy to ninety-five percent had been 
physically assaulted; and sixty-eight percent met the criteria for 
post-traumatic stress disorder); see also Devon Brewer et al., Extent, Trends, 
and Perpetrators of Prostitution-Related Homicide in the United States, 51 J. 
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prostitution fuels sex trafficking by feeding the demand for 
commercial sex and providing a “façade behind which traffickers 
for sexual exploitation operate.”199 In other words, prostitution, 
especially when legalized, allows trafficking victims to hide in 
plain sight—to an outside observer, a trafficked victim would 
appear to be willfully prostituting herself.200 Men who solicit 
prostitutes provide the necessary demand to fuel both of these 
violent industries and are to blame for perpetuating this form of 
violence against women.201 These men are, and should be, held 
accountable. 
This Note in no way argues that men who solicit or attempt 
to solicit adult prostitutes should be free from criminal liability. 
In fact, other countries have shown that focusing prosecutions 
on the demand for prostitution—the men who purchase 
sex— can lead to a sharp decrease in sex trafficking.202 However, 
this Note suggests that soliciting or attempting to solicit an 
adult prostitute is less morally culpable than sex trafficking 
children. Men who seek out a prostitute, and who have perhaps 
been duped by pimps or victims themselves about the victim’s 
age, should not face the same liability as if they had sex 
trafficked children. A child sex trafficking conviction results in 
 
FORENSIC SCI. 1101, 1107 (2006) (finding that prostitutes have the highest 
homicide victimization rate of any set of women ever studied). 
 199. See Bureau of Public Affairs, supra note 197 
Prostitution and related activities—including pimping and 
patronizing or maintaining brothels—fuel the growth of 
modern-day slavery by providing a façade behind which traffickers 
for sexual exploitation operate. Where prostitution is legalized or 
tolerated, there is a greater demand for human trafficking victims 
and nearly always an increase in the number of women and 
children trafficked into commercial sex slavery. 
 200. See Rachel Lloyd, Legalizing Prostitution Leads to More Trafficking, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/E6X3-AL87 (last visited Jan. 31, 
2020) (explaining that legalization of prostitution in some countries has led to 
an increase in trafficking because traffickers recruit children and 
marginalized women to meet the increased demand for commercial sex) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 201. See id. (quoting the Swedish Government’s position that 
“[i]nternational trafficking in human beings could not flourish but for the 
existence of local prostitution markets where men are willing and able to buy 
and sell women and children for sexual exploitation”). 
 202. See id. (stating that in 1999 the Swedish government began 
aggressively prosecuting customers—instead of prostitutes—and saw a 
seventy-five percent decrease in men buying sex, thus reducing the overall size 
of the country’s prostitution and sex trafficking industries). 
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at least a ten-year imprisonment sentence and at most a life 
sentence.203 If not given a life sentence, a convicted person must 
register as a sex offender,204 which has drastic consequences 
including permanently limiting where he can live, work, 
socialize, and travel.205 On the other hand, soliciting a prostitute 
is typically a state-level offense206 that does not require sex 
offender registration and generally results in a maximum 
incarceration period of one year for a first-time offense.207 
One man who represents the importance of distinguishing 
between attempting to solicit an adult prostitute and child sex 
trafficking is Raymond Valas.208 Valas did not engage in any of 
the widespread forms of modern-day trafficking.209 He did not 
enslave, kidnap, sell, collect proceeds from, or smuggle the 
victim.210 Rather, he went on Backpage.com, sent messages to a 
variety of prostitutes advertising their services, and met up with 
 
 203. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1) (2018) (stating that a defendant will be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment “not less than 10 years or for life”); see 
also 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(2) (providing that the minimum period of 
incarceration increases to fifteen years if the offense involved force, threats of 
force, fraud, or coercion); 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d) (describing an additional penalty 
of twenty-five years of imprisonment for obstructing the enforcement of the 
child sex trafficking statute). 
 204. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(1), (3)(A)(i) (2018), (providing that any 
defendant convicted of a sex offense must register as a sex offender and stating 
that sex trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 is a Tier II sex offense). 
 205. See Fenzel et al., Understanding Collateral Consequences of Registry 
Laws: An Examination of the Perceptions of Sex Offender Registrants, 11 JUST. 
POL’Y J. 1, 4 (2014) (describing the collateral consequences of sex offender 
registration). 
 206. Soliciting a prostitute can be prosecuted under various federal laws, 
such as 18 U.S.C. 2422(b) (2018), but it is much more frequently charged at 
the state level. See generally U.S. Federal and State Prostitution Laws and 
Related Punishments, PROCON, https://perma.cc/YDL3-5T3Q?type=image 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 207. See id. (providing examples of state level solicitation of a prostitution 
penalties, including a maximum incarceration period of thirty days in 
Arkansas, six months in California, and one year in Georgia). 
 208. United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 248 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 209. Compare G.A. Res. 55/25, at 32 (Nov. 15, 2000) (defining human 
trafficking as using threats, force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, or 
abuse of power to exploit another person), with Valas, 822 F.3d at 240 
(explaining that the defendant claimed that he attempted to hire an adult 
prostitute, as the victim’s advertisement stated that she was nineteen). 
 210. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 235 (explaining that the defendant solicited 
the victim to perform commercial sex acts). 
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one of them who, unbeknownst to him, was a minor.211 Valas, 
and others like him, could undoubtedly be prosecuted for 
attempting to solicit a prostitute.212 Instead, due to the strict 
liability nature of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), Valas was convicted of 
child sex trafficking because he “purchase[d] illicit sexual acts 
from” a trafficking victim.213  
Some might argue that Valas’s behavior was precisely what 
Congress intended to criminalize when it enacted 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1591. In fact, Congress added the words “solicits or patronizes” 
to the list of activities criminalized under the statute to make 
“absolutely clear for judges, juries, prosecutors, and law 
enforcement officials that criminals who purchase sexual acts 
from human trafficking victims may be arrested, prosecuted, 
and convicted as sex trafficking offenders when this is merited 
by the facts of a particular case.”214 Nevertheless, the final 
clause of this sentence is key.215 Criminalizing typical 
sex-buyers like Valas without assessing whether the facts of the 
case merit a distinction diminishes the congressional purpose of 
the statute.216  
Even if, despite his denial,217 Valas knew he was “obtaining” 
or “soliciting” an underage trafficking victim,218 thus placing his 
conviction squarely within the statute’s parameters, his case 
still raises the issue of when criminalization of 
similarly-situated sex-buyers would be—and more importantly, 
would not be—“merited by the facts of the case.”219 Knowledge 
 
 211. See id. (stating that the defendant hired the victim through her 
Backpage.com advertisement which claimed she was an adult). 
 212. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-346(B) (2019) (“Any person who offers 
money or its equivalent to another for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts 
. . . shall be guilty of solicitation of prostitution . . . .”). 
 213. See JVTA of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 109(2), 129 Stat. 227 (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) (stating that courts have interpreted the term “obtain” to 
encompass those who purchase illicit sexual acts from trafficking victims). 
 214. Id. § 109(4). 
 215. See id. (stating that criminalization of sex-buyers must be merited by 
the facts of a particular case). 
 216. See id. (describing the statute’s purpose). 
 217. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 241 (discussing Valas’s naiveté defense based 
on the victim’s advertisement which stated that she was a nineteen-year-old 
prostitute). 
 218. See JVTA of 2015 § 109(1) (defining a sex trafficker as one who 
knowingly obtains or solicits a victim). 
 219. Id. at § 109(4). 
KIDS, NOT COMMODITIES  963 
 
that the victim is, in fact, a victim of human trafficking should 
merit such factual distinction.220 However, if a defendant 
attempts to solicit an adult prostitute and is unaware that the 
person who shows up to meet him is an underage human 
trafficking victim, his pre-conceived expectations of this person 
might render his “opportunity to observe” unreasonable under 
§ 1591(c). In other words, if a defendant utilized a service such 
as Backpage.com and ordered the services of a prostitute who 
held herself out to be twenty years old, then that defendant 
would expect a twenty-year-old woman to show up to meet him. 
He would have ample “opportunity to observe” her, but how 
could he reasonably be expected to ascertain her true age of, say 
seventeen, or her status as a trafficking victim? If ascertaining 
her true age is an unreasonable expectation, then his 
opportunity to observe her must, too, be unreasonable under  
§ 1591(c). 
Therefore, given the drastic differences in both culpability 
and conviction consequences between sex trafficking children 
and attempting to solicit an adult prostitute, courts should 
carefully distinguish between the two actions when assessing a 
defendant’s “opportunity to observe” a victim. 
2. “Relationships” Between Defendants and Victims 
One might argue that 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) already 
distinguishes sex trafficking from attempting to solicit an adult 
prostitute by considering the existence of “a relationship or 
established social connection between a defendant and 
victim.”221 A violent, coercive relationship with unbalanced 
power dynamics, for instance, is illuminative of a defendant’s 
observation opportunity of a victim and may merit labeling him 
a sex trafficker.222 In other words, the existence of an abusive 
relationship between a defendant and victim could be evidence 
 
 220. See, e.g., United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(stating that a man who responded to an advertisement offering an 
eleven-year-old girl for sex knowingly enticed her). 
 221. See supra Part II.B. 
 222. See United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(discussing Robinson’s repeated threats to kill the victim if she left him or 
failed to pay him). 
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that the defendant is a pimp engaged in sex trafficking.223 On 
the other hand, a man who merely attempted to solicit a 
prostitute would have no former social connection to the victim, 
which would diminish the reasonableness of any observation 
opportunity he had with the victim. 
Nonetheless, a danger exists in encouraging courts to 
broadly consider the existence of a relationship between a 
defendant and victim. To some, Robinson’s conviction might 
seem unfair because the victim adamantly testified that 
Robinson was her boyfriend and in no way her trafficker or 
pimp.224 Other defendants might present similar evidence that 
they were in a romantic relationship with the victim, which, if 
coupled with a lack of evidence of abuse or violence and a 
victim’s testimony that she prostituted out of her own free will, 
could weigh against a finding of sex trafficking.225 However, the 
victim’s response in Robinson is typical of child sex trafficking 
victims.226 Trafficking victims often believe their pimps are their 
boyfriends due to the pimp’s manipulative recruitment 
tactics.227 Pimps frequently target young, vulnerable girls who 
have low self-esteem.228 Foster children, runaways, and the 
 
 223. See Katherine Lymn & Amy Dalrymple, Manipulation and Threats 
from Pimps Keep Victims in the Life of Prostitution Unwillingly, BILLINGS 
GAZETTE (Jan. 6, 2015), https://perma.cc/2AML-6BYL (last visited Jan. 28, 
2020) (“Experts say trafficking shares the dynamic of domestic violence . . . .”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 224. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 27 (“Throughout the trial, Jane Doe 
insisted that Robinson was her boyfriend rather than her pimp, and that he 
was only living off of her income as a prostitute rather than facilitating that 
line of work.”). 
 225. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2018) (providing that force and coercion 
are elements of sex trafficking of children). 
 226. See Lisa Holl Chang, Comment, Reaching Safe Harbor: A Path for 
Sex-Trafficking Victims in Wisconsin, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1489, 1497 (explaining 
that traffickers convince vulnerable girls to enter the commercial sex industry 
by posing as their boyfriends). 
 227. See SHI Staff, Why Her? What You Need to Know About How Pimps 
Choose, SHARED HOPE INT’L (Apr. 10, 2013), https://perma.cc/PN8Y-TSZE (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2020) (identifying the four steps of recruitment as identifying 
the need of the child, fulfilling the need, removing any other sources of need 
fulfillment, and exploiting the child’s dependence for need fulfillment) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 228. See SMITH & COLOMA, supra note 189, at 75 (“Pimps find it easiest to 
manipulate vulnerable girls with low self-esteem, girls from troubled homes, 
foster children, runaways, and sometimes the mentally disabled.”). 
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mentally disabled often meet these criteria.229 In Renting Lacy: 
A Story of America’s Prostituted Children, Linda Smith and 
Cindy Coloma describe the “courtship” process: 
The pimp will introduce himself and gradually get to know a 
girl. He will listen to her problems and act like he cares. He 
may shower her with gifts and compliments. Perhaps he’ll 
provide her with food and a place to sleep at night. However, 
he’ll always establish himself as the victim’s “boyfriend,” 
creating a sense of protection and security. This period can 
last anywhere from a few days to several months.230  
Following courtship, the pimp strategically isolates the 
victim from friends and family in order to increase her 
dependence on him.231 He then gradually introduces physical 
violence into the relationship.232 One article explains, “Pimp 
control is the art of making a girl feel wanted, enough that she 
suffers the punches for the emotional connection.”233 
Eventually, through abuse and manipulation of their 
“relationship,” the pimp convinces the victim that she wants to 
be a prostitute—she will do anything to protect her relationship 
after her pimp has brainwashed her into thinking only he will 
provide for, protect, and love her.234 “You wait on your man hand 
 
 229. See id. (explaining that these categories of girls are often targeted 
because of their vulnerability and loneliness). 
 230. Id. at 75–76. 
 231. See id. at 76 
As the pimp listens to the youth’s “troubles” at home or school, and 
as he is establishing himself as her savior, the pimp also works to 
isolate the child from those who may object to their relationship. 
The strategic removal of friends and family members ensures, as 
the relationship shifts from caring to exploitative, that the child will 
have no one to turn to other than the pimp. 
 232. See id. at 76–77 
A pimp typically, however, uses a mixture of love and affection with 
anger and violence. He’s quick to fluctuate between the two states. 
He may tell one of his girls he loves her and in the next minute slap 
her across the face. This creates a powerful combination of love and 
fear that makes the victim obedient. 
 233. Lymn & Dalrymple, supra note 223. 
 234. See SMITH & COLOMA, supra note 189, at 76 (stating that after the 
isolation period, the pimp will gradually introduce the idea of prostitution 
through various manipulative tactics); see also Lymn & Dalrymple, supra note 
223 (“Through psychological manipulation, the pimp brainwashes his victims 
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and foot,” one former prostitute described.235 “You go to prison 
for him, you take cases for him, you go get his money every 
night, rain, sleet or snow. You pull other women for him.”236 
The pimp knows how to maintain power.237 As Smith and 
Coloma described,  
The pimp’s primary focus is control: controlling every 
movement the girls make and every dollar they bring in. The 
physical control is easier to identify and observe; the 
psychological abuse can be more difficult to understand. A 
girl who is frequently beaten, cut, raped, and tortured is 
guaranteed to do everything the pimp wants her to do.238 
Iceberg Slim, a renowned pimp, described how he executes this 
practice: “I want to be the boss of her life, even her thoughts. I 
got to con them that Lincoln never freed the slaves.”239 Another 
pimp stated, “After you have broken her spirit, she has no sense 
of self-value. Now pimp, put a price tag on the item you have 
manufactured.”240 
The prolonged abuse and exploitation often blinds victims 
to the reality of their situations, and they continue to believe 
their pimps are their boyfriends.241 The emotional element of the 
“relationship” is commonly the only thing keeping victims from 
leaving.242 Therefore, taking into account the existence of a 
relationship243 between the defendant and victim in “reasonable 
opportunity to observe” analyses is problematic and 
counterproductive. It might marginally aid in preventing the 
over-criminalization of sex-buyers (who, unlike pimps, have no 
 
into thinking only he can provide for them and that no one else understands 
them . . . .”). 
 235. Lymn & Dalrymple, supra note 223. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See SMITH & COLOMA, supra note 189, at 76–77 (explaining the 
“powerful combination of love and fear” that pimps implement in their 
processes of controlling a victim). 
 238. Id. at 76. 
 239. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 28, at 46. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See SMITH & COLOMA, supra note 189, at 76 (stating that the pimp 
always establishes himself as the victim’s boyfriend in order to create a sense 
of security). 
 242. See Lymn & Dalrymple, supra note 223 (“If not for the emotional 
element, the girls would leave . . . .”). 
 243. See supra Part II.B (providing “a relationship or established social 
connection between a defendant and victim” as a factor). 
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prior relationship with a victim), but only at the expense of 
inadequately protecting victims. A better way to prevent 
over-criminalization, to be discussed in the following subsection, 
is to eliminate the consideration of “knowledge of signs of 
human trafficking” from § 1591(c) analyses. 
3. Knowledge of Signs of Sex Trafficking: Research vs. Direct 
Contact 
According to the “reasonable opportunity to observe” factor 
list, courts take into account a defendant’s knowledge of signs of 
human trafficking,244 which perhaps prevents the 
over-criminalization of non-traffickers engaged in distinct 
behavior such as attempting to solicit an adult prostitute.245 
Under this theory, it is reasonable to apply the child sex 
trafficking statute to a person who claims he believed he was 
with an of-age prostitute if he has a previous criminal history, 
for example, of sex trafficking children. His criminal history 
would demonstrate a likely knowledge of the signs and dangers 
of human trafficking, so he either knew or should have known 
that he was with a child sex trafficking victim based on his prior 
experiences.  
However, the broad categorization of this factor as 
“knowledge of signs of human trafficking”246 still paves the way 
for over-criminalization. The factor not only encompasses 
human trafficking criminal histories, but also work-related 
training and academic research.247 The Valas court, for 
instance, noted the relevancy of a Department of Defense 
PowerPoint presentation used by the prosecution to prove 
Valas’s awareness of the signs of human trafficking.248 The court 
stated that “as a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army, 
 
 244. See supra Part II.B (providing “prior involvement with prostitutes or 
knowledge of signs of human trafficking” as a factor). 
 245. See United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 241 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(explaining that Valas’s admission that he attended anti-trafficking training 
cast doubt on his defense that he believed the victim was an adult). 
 246. See supra Part II.B. 
 247. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 241 (noting evidence that the defendant 
attended an annual anti-trafficking training). 
 248. See id. (stating that the PowerPoint presentation made it more likely 
that Valas contacted the victim for a sexual encounter, rather than for a 
research project). 
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[Valas] was trained on human trafficking annually: its signs, 
dangers, and horrors.”249 It concluded that the PowerPoint 
presentation made it more probable that Valas contacted the 
victim for sexual relations rather than to conduct a research 
interview as he defended because “a career Army officer who 
takes annual human trafficking awareness training is informed 
not to invite a prostitute into his private hotel room for an 
‘interview.’”250 It was irrelevant to the court that Valas testified 
he could not recall whether he had seen that precise PowerPoint 
presentation.251 The court stated, “Even if these were not the 
exact slides that Valas trained on, they at a minimum alerted 
the jury to the type of training Valas would have 
experienced.”252 
Allowing this factor of knowledge of human trafficking to 
encompass work-related trainings expands the crime of child 
sex trafficking. If Valas spent a total of only one hour conversing 
with his victim yet still met the standard because he admitted 
to previously receiving anti-trafficking training,253 then there 
might be no scenario in which a court would conclude that a 
defendant with prior training interacted with a sex trafficking 
victim but had an insufficient “opportunity to observe” her. In 
other words, does one’s attendance at an anti-trafficking 
training necessarily mean he will be able to spot the signs of it 
in a potential victim? Is it fair to hold defendants to such a 
standard? 
The factor should be narrowed to avoid unjust results. 
Attending training sessions on human trafficking is very 
different from gathering first-hand experience through directly 
interacting with victims.254 Compare, for example, the histories 
 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See id. (declaring that the use of the slides was proper even though 
Valas could not remember if he had seen them before). 
 252. Id. 
 253. See id. at 235, 241 (explaining that Valas spent thirty minutes with 
the victim on two separate days, never discussed her background, and 
conversed with her only about her appearance’s similarity to her 
Backpage.com photos). 
 254. See Diane Cole, A Message from Your Brain: I’m Not Good at 
Remembering What I Hear, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 13, 2014), https://
perma.cc/6EW4-RZ4Z (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (describing a study that 
found that people remember tactile experiences with more regularity than 
auditory experiences) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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of Robinson and Valas.255 Both have experiences that satisfy the 
factor of “knowledge of human trafficking,” but in starkly 
different ways. Robinson admitted to pimping multiple times in 
the past,256 which falls under the same factor category as Valas’s 
attendance at a human trafficking PowerPoint presentation.257 
Had the court not given a life sentence to Ian Sean Gordon, 
Alyssa Beck’s trafficker,258 his sex trafficking conviction259 could 
be assessed at a subsequent criminal proceeding in the same 
manner as a former flight attendant’s standard work training 
that instructed staff to be on the lookout for certain signs that a 
traveler might be a victim of human trafficking.260 A court could 
find that an employee at a shelter for trafficking victims who 
used his position to recruit and sell victims261 had “knowledge of 
 
 255. Compare United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(describing the two-and-a-half year pimping relationship between the 
defendant and victim), with Valas, 822 F.3d at 241 (noting the significance of 
an anti-trafficking training presentation which Valas may not have even 
remembered). 
 256. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 28 (discussing Robinson’s prior 
involvement with pimping). 
 257. See United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 241 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(discussing Valas’s annual anti-trafficking work training). 
 258. See supra Part I (describing the story of a fifteen-year-old girl who 
was sex trafficked). 
 259. See Miller, supra note 1 (stating that Gordon pleaded guilty to sex 
trafficking and was sentenced to life in prison). 
 260. See Meet the Abduction Survivor Helping Airlines Stop Human 
Trafficking, CNN (Oct. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/P5RC-E4JC?type=image 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (describing various ways to identify trafficking 
victims in airports such as looking for those who have tattoos, are not dressed 
appropriately, and are afraid to discuss their destination or travel plans) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 261. See Former Staff Mentor at Florida Keys Children’s Shelter Convicted 
of Child Sex Trafficking, FBI (Nov. 6, 2015), https://perma.cc/GJ98-RPRM 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2020) (discussing how an employee recruited girls from a 
youth shelter to become prostitutes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); see also Deanna Hackney, Arizona Migrant Shelter Worker Accused 
of Sexually Abusing Teenage Boys, CNN (Aug. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc
/HRM9-FMNS (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (describing how a shelter employee 
abused migrant children who were at risk for trafficking) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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signs of human trafficking” in the same way as a college student 
who once wrote a research paper on human trafficking.262  
Robinson, Gordon, and the shelter employee are much less 
likely to forget the details of their direct experiences with 
victims than Valas, the flight attendant, or the college 
student.263 Indeed, Valas admitted to attending annual 
anti-trafficking training, but testified he could not remember 
the training or if he had seen the exact slides offered by the 
prosecution.264 He, and other employees, are under no obligation 
to remember or even pay attention during a couple-hour work 
training, but courts can assume that defendants remember such 
trainings and apply the information to their interactions with 
potential victims years after the trainings have concluded.265 
Direct contact with victims provides a much deeper basis of 
knowledge than academic research or work-related training,266 
yet courts erroneously treat the two experiences as the same in 
their assessments of § 1591(c)’s factor of “knowledge of signs of 
human trafficking.”267  
The outlined issues with the current interpretation of what 
evidence is necessary to show a “reasonable opportunity to 
observe” a child sex trafficking victim display a need to clarify 
the standard. To eradicate the issues of both under- and 
over-criminalization, the next section advocates a revised factor 
list that courts should use when assessing evidence under 
§ 1591(c).  
 
 262. See UMass-Amherst Offers Intro to Human Trafficking Online Class 
to Raise Awareness, MASSLIVE (Jul. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/DR8U-35GE 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (describing an online course which aims to teach 
students how to spot signs of human trafficking) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 263. See Cole, supra note 254 (explaining that people remember what they 
hear far less often than they remember what they see or touch). 
 264. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 241 (stating that Valas could not remember 
whether the slides depicted the exact training he received). 
 265. See id. (declaring that even if Valas did not remember the training, it 
was similar enough to what he experienced). 
 266. See Cole, supra note 254 (discussing the differences in memory recall 
depending on “whether we see it, hear it, or touch it”). 
 267. See supra Part II.B. 
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IV. A Better Approach for Victims and Defendants 
As demonstrated in Part III, the current factor list that 
courts use to assess whether a defendant had a “reasonable 
opportunity to observe” a victim is inherently flawed. This 
section recommends solutions to mend the problematic factors 
and advocates for a new list of factors that courts should 
consider when assessing whether evidence is sufficient to satisfy 
§ 1591(c). This new list is a more efficient and effective way to 
protect victims of various forms of sex trafficking while 
simultaneously safeguarding defendants from being convicted 
of crimes that do not match their level of culpability.  
A. Under-Criminalization Due to Emphasis on Physical 
Interaction 
As discussed, courts consider whether a defendant had a 
physical interaction with a victim when evaluating evidence 
under § 1591(c).268 Webcam sex trafficking raises the issue of 
whether a perpetrator can reasonably observe a victim by 
viewing a virtual depiction of that person.269 Courts can better 
protect victims of webcam sex trafficking and the statute’s 
legislative intent270 if they expand the emphasis on physical 
interactions to include virtual interactions. Restricting the 
factor to in-person or face-to-face communications prevents the 
statute from adapting to developments in technology.271 While 
in 2000,272 Congress had no way of predicting that human 
trafficking would rapidly inhabit the cyberworld with 
 
 268. See supra Part II.B (providing a defendant’s “physical interaction 
with a victim” as a relevant factor to interpreting the statute). 
 269. See supra Part III.A (explaining how the factor list fails to incorporate 
virtual interactions). 
 270. See TVPA of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 112, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) (explaining that Congress enacted the statute because no 
law existed that covered the range of activities in the human trafficking 
scheme). 
 271. See Mendoza, supra note 143 (“The relatively new crime of webcam 
sex tourism is spreading rapidly, with new digital technologies sparking what 
the United Nations call an ‘alarming growth of new forms of child sexual 
exploitation online.’”). 
 272. See generally TVPA of 2000 § 1 (providing that the statute was 
enacted in 2000). 
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perpetrators flocking to the internet to exploit victims, this new 
virtual crime cannot reasonably be excluded from the “range of 
conduct punished as sex trafficking.”273 Congress selected this 
broad language precisely to allow the law to adapt to unexpected 
developments in the trafficking industry.274 Requiring that the 
statute only encompass those crimes that existed when 
Congress enacted it would be inefficient and contrary to the 
statute’s purpose.275 But most importantly, it would leave 
victims desperately vulnerable and unprotected.276 Therefore, 
the interpretive factor should be amended to guide courts to 
consider “a physical or virtual interaction between a defendant 
and victim.”  
B. Over-Criminalization in Violation of Legislative Intent 
Congress intended to criminalize modern forms of 
slavery,277 but the current factor list allows criminalization of 
sex-buyers who seek to solicit an adult prostitute.278 While this, 
of course, is criminally punishable behavior,279 it does not 
always fall under the category of sex trafficking or merit the 
higher sentences and consequences that come with a sex 
trafficking conviction.280 A man who expects to briefly interact 
with an adult prostitute might not have a “reasonable 
 
 273. JVTA of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 108(c), 129 Stat. 227 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1591). 
 274. See id. § 109(1) (enacting the statute because no law existed that 
criminalized all behavior under the umbrella term of “sex trafficking”). 
 275. See TVPA of 2000 § 102(a) (stating the purpose to combat the 
contemporary manifestation of trafficking in persons). 
 276. See supra Part III.A (explaining how victims of virtual trafficking are 
unprotected). 
 277. See TVPA of 2000 § 102(a) (“The purposes of this division are to 
combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose 
victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective 
punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims.”). 
 278. See supra Part III.B (explaining how the application of the current 
factors over-criminalizes certain groups of people). 
 279. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (2018) (criminalizing the solicitation of a 
prostitute); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2018) (criminalizing the promotion of 
prostitution); U.S. Federal and State Prostitution Laws and Related 
Punishments, supra note 206 (providing each state’s penalties for solicitation 
of a prostitute). 
 280. See supra Part III.B. 
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opportunity to observe” a victim who has held herself out to be 
of legal age.281 
To remedy this issue, courts should consider a factor that 
imposes a minimum time period on an interaction between a 
defendant and victim—that is, set an amount of time that would 
render an “opportunity to observe” presumptively reasonable. 
Perhaps a total interaction time of one hour, as displayed in 
Valas,282 is reasonable, however it still raises the issue of how 
much time would constitute an unreasonable opportunity to 
observe a victim. The ideal time period should afford ample time 
to assess whether, despite any preconceived notions about 
someone’s adult status, a person is actually an underage victim 
of sex trafficking. If there were such a time limit, individuals 
would have ample notice under the law to assess a potential 
victim and those who unknowingly, unintentionally, and briefly 
interact with sex trafficking victims would not face sex 
trafficking criminalization.  
The Eleventh Circuit held that a defendant had a 
“reasonable opportunity to observe” a sex trafficking victim 
when he spent twenty minutes photographing her for 
Backpage.com advertisements.283 Twenty minutes was a 
“considerable interaction” according to the court.284 Outside of 
the context of sex trafficking, other courts have also determined 
that twenty minutes was the minimum time requirement to 
have a “reasonable opportunity to observe.” In Nettles v. 
Wainwright,285 for example, the Fifth Circuit held that a victim 
could reliably testify about a perpetrator’s identity because she 
viewed him for “more than twenty minutes” and therefore had 
a sufficient opportunity to observe him.286  
 
 281. See supra Part III.B (providing examples of inappropriate 
applications of the statute). 
 282. See United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(explaining that the victim came to Valas’s room for thirty minutes two days 
in a row). 
 283. See United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960, 975–76 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(stating that twenty minutes was a “considerable interaction,” and therefore 
a “reasonable opportunity to observe”). 
 284. Id. 
 285. 677 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 286. See id. at 414 (applying a minimum time limit to be able to render a 
reliable identification of a perpetrator). 
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The Supreme Court of Maine imposed the same time limit 
on a witness’s reliable observation of a defendant’s sanity.287 
The court stated that it “certainly know[s] of no jurisdiction in 
which the opinion of a lay witness, as to the sanity of a man, 
whom he has seen less than twenty minutes, would be regarded 
as admissible.”288 The Arkansas Supreme Court quoted Maine’s 
twenty-minute time limit when it held that a non-expert 
witness’s less-than-five-minute observation of a defendant was 
an unreasonable opportunity to observe her.289  
Lastly, certain states require police officers to observe 
suspected drunk drivers for a minimum of twenty minutes 
before breathalyzing them.290 For instance, a Tennessee court 
excluded the results of a breathalyzer test because “the 
defendant had been observed for seventeen minutes rather than 
the twenty minutes required by law.”291 Therefore, based on the 
time limits implied by other courts in the § 1591(c) context as 
well as those set in other areas of the law pertaining to 
reasonable observation opportunities, courts evaluating 
evidence under § 1591(c) should consider a factor of “at least a 
twenty minute interaction” between a defendant and child sex 
trafficking victim. 
C. Over-Criminalization Due to Consideration of Relationships 
and Knowledge of Human Trafficking 
To better target the conduct that Congress intended to 
criminalize,292 the interpretive factors should gauge whether 
 
 287. See State v. Turner, 138 A. 562, 563 (Me. 1927) (requiring that 
witnesses have a sufficient opportunity to observe a defendant before 
testifying about his sanity). 
 288. Id.; see also Henderson v. State, 94 S.W.2d 467, 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1936) (permitting an expert witness to testify about the sanity of the defendant 
after viewing him for “about twenty minutes” during trial). 
 289. See Spence v. State, 184 S.W.2d 986, 988 (Ark. 1931) (“They had no 
reasonable opportunity to observe her acts and conduct except for a period of 
time not exceeding five minutes . . . .”). 
 290. See State v. Ugrovics, 982 A.2d 1211, 1214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2009) (noting that officers must observe suspected drunk drivers for the 
prescribed twenty minutes before administering a breathalyzer test); State v. 
Sensing, 843 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Tenn. 1992) (same). 
 291. Sensing, 843 S.W.2d at 416. 
 292. See TVPA of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 112, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) (criminalizing contemporary trafficking in persons). 
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the defendant engaged in common forms of trafficking behavior 
by focusing on a defendant’s abuse and coercion of a victim. As 
discussed in Part III.B.2, broadly assessing the existence of a 
“relationship” between the defendant and the victim would not 
properly solve under- and over-criminalization issues due to the 
typical recruiting tactics of pimps manipulating victims into 
believing the two are in a relationship. Therefore, that factor 
should be eliminated and the list instead should include “a 
defendant’s use of force or coercion on a victim” and “a 
defendant’s knowledge that a victim has a pimp or is otherwise 
performing sexual services not of her or his own free will.”  
Additionally, as founder of the Human Trafficking Institute 
John Cotton Richmond recommended, a factor should be added 
that targets “[a] defendant’s possession, review, or absence of [a] 
victim’s identification documents”293 to further measure a 
defendant’s use of coercion on a victim, and thus, his 
“opportunity to observe” her. This factor would especially 
protect undocumented persons. Undocumented victims often 
fear that they will be deported if they report their traffickers to 
law enforcement.294 Traffickers capitalize on victims’ fears and 
immigration statuses by taking their passports and identifying 
papers to restrict any ability to escape.295 
Finally, under the current factor list, courts consider “prior 
involvement with prostitutes or knowledge of signs of human 
trafficking.”296 However, as explained, this has the potential to 
criminalize those who merely attend a work-related training or 
conduct academic research on human trafficking in the same 
 
 293. Richmond, supra note 36, at 310. 
 294.    See Stephen P. Wood, The Intersection of Human Trafficking and 
Immigration, HARV. L.: PETRIE FLOM (June 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/CC5F-
7MHT (last visited Mar. 28, 2020) (“The ever-looming threat of 
deportation . . . can be a significant deterrent to victims reporting their 
traffickers, making them even more reliant on them for perceived protection. 
Many traffickers use the threat of deportation to control their victims, and the 
widespread enforcement of immigration policy reinforces that fear.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 295.     See id. (“These are people who are often afraid, alone and frequently 
have had their passports and other identifying papers taken from them by 
their traffickers. They have no way to contact family or friends, as they are 
stripped of their identity and have to rely on their traffickers for survival.”).  
 296. See supra Part II.B. 
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manner as those who have a history of actively recruiting, 
manipulating, and abusing trafficking victims.297 Because direct 
interaction with victims should be distinguished from learning 
about trafficking through work trainings,298 the factor should be 
specified to “prior direct experience with human trafficking 
victims.” This new factor specifies prior involvement with 
human trafficking, not prostitution, to preserve Congress’s 
intent to protect child sex trafficking victims under 18 U.S.C.  
§ 1591.299 Though the human trafficking and adult prostitution 
industries often overlap,300 the factor should specifically target 
defendants with a history of human trafficking in order to 
preserve Congress’s statutory intent. 
D. A Revised Factor List 
As this Note has demonstrated, the current interpretation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) is problematic and can lead to 
under-criminalization of child sex trafficking as well as 
over-criminalization of non-trafficking behavior. In order to 
better prevent courts from perpetuating these issues, this Note 
recommends the following modified factor list that courts should 
use to determine whether a defendant had a “reasonable 
opportunity to observe” a victim. In assessing the evidence 
regarding whether this standard is met, courts should consider 
the following factors: 
1. A defendant’s prior direct experiences with human 
trafficking victims; 
2. A defendant’s physical or virtual interaction with a 
victim; 
3. At least a twenty-minute interaction between a 
defendant and victim; 
 
 297. See supra Part III.B (explaining how the broad interpretation of the 
factor causes over-criminalization). 
 298. See supra Part III.B.3 (arguing that direct contact with victims 
provides a more reasonable “opportunity to observe” a victim than other 
indirect interactions). 
 299. See TVPA of 2000 § 102(a), (b) (enacting the statute to combat 
contemporary forms of child sex trafficking). 
 300. See Bureau of Public Affairs, supra note 197 (explaining how 
prostitution fuels human trafficking); see also Chuck Neubauer, Most Human 
Trafficking Related to Prostitution, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2011), https://
perma.cc/P66S-3TXA (last visited Jan. 29, 2020) (stating that more than 
eighty percent of suspected incidents of human trafficking involved forced 
prostitution) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
KIDS, NOT COMMODITIES  977 
 
4. A defendant’s use of force or coercion on a victim; 
5. A defendant’s knowledge that a victim has a pimp 
or is otherwise performing sexual services not of her 
own free will; 
6. A defendant’s possession, review, or absence of a 
victim’s identification documents; 
7. A victim’s youthful demeanor; 
8. A victim’s disclosure of minor status; 
9. A victim’s deceitfulness about her age;  
10. A defendant’s knowledge of the background or 
underage social network of a victim; and 
11. A defendant’s participation in the recruitment or 
advertisement of a victim’s services. 
Using these factors will better ensure accuracy, protection, 
and fairness in child sex trafficking cases. This standardized list 
of factors based on many analyses of the current state of 
modern-day human trafficking will aid courts in consistently 
employing accurate interpretations of § 1591(c), as well as 
provide stronger protection for victims and fairness for 
defendants.  
V. Conclusion 
“The only way not to find this problem in any city is simply not 
to look for it.” 
 
–John F. Clark, President of the National Center for Missing 
and Exploited Children301 
 
When Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of 2000, it stated:  
One of the founding documents of the United States, the 
Declaration of Independence, recognizes the inherent dignity 
and worth of all people. It states that all men are created 
equal and that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable rights. The right to be free from slavery 
and involuntary servitude is among those unalienable 
rights.302  
 
     301.     Marianne Clyde, Not One More Victim, FAUQUIER TIMES (Aug. 11, 
2018), https://perma.cc/6N2M-6G6G (last visited Mar. 28, 2020) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 302. TVPA of 2000 § 102(b)(22). 
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It is the duty of courts to earnestly safeguard these 
unalienable rights. Failing to properly interpret statutes in light 
of changing technology and criminal industries allows victims 
and defendants to fall through the cracks. 
At age sixteen, Alyssa Beck escaped sexual slavery and was 
present when a federal judge sentenced her trafficker to life in 
prison.303 However, most victims are not as fortunate. Despite 
recent improvements in awareness and law enforcement,304 
there are still more than 10 million child trafficking victims 
across the globe.305 Protecting children like Alyssa depends on 
clarifying the interpretation of a “reasonable opportunity to 
observe” a child sex trafficking victim under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c). 
In recent years, courts have assessed whether a defendant had 
a “reasonable opportunity to observe” a child sex trafficking 
victim by focusing on his physical interaction with the victim, 
his knowledge of human trafficking, his relationship with the 
victim, and other factors.306 However, the current list of factors 
that courts utilize creates a plethora of issues.307 It 
under-criminalizes legitimate forms of modern sex trafficking, 
such as webcam sex trafficking,308 and over-criminalizes 
behavior outside the realm of sex trafficking.309 To resolve these 
issues, courts should instead focus on factors that encompass 
virtual interactions, coercive and violent relationships, and a 
defendant’s prior direct experiences with human trafficking 
victims.310  
 
 303. See Miller, supra note 1 (stating that Ian Sean Gordon received one 
of the first life sentences for trafficking in the United States). 
 304. See Rebecca Sadwick, 7 Ways Technology Is Fighting Human 
Trafficking, FORBES (Jan. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/WB4G-8FCA (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2020) (explaining various technological advancements that 
allow law enforcement officers to combat new forms of human trafficking) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 305. See Forced Labour, Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking, supra 
note 26 (noting that there are currently 40.3 million victims trapped in human 
trafficking, twenty-five percent of whom are children). 
 306. See supra Part II.B (providing a full list of factors that courts use). 
 307. See supra Part III (explaining how the factor list under-criminalizes 
sex trafficking acts and over-criminalizes other behavior). 
 308. See supra Part III.A (discussing the application of the statute to 
webcam sex trafficking). 
 309. See supra Part III.B (explaining the consequences of problematic 
factors). 
 310. See supra Part IV.D (providing a full list of recommended factors). 
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The government is responsible for eradicating the rampant 
spread of child sex trafficking. Courts can perform their role in 
this global effort by applying an accurate and protective 
interpretation of the child sex trafficking statute. As civil rights 
leader Fannie Lou Hamer once said, “Nobody’s free until 
everybody’s free.”311 
 
 311. See Terry Fitzpatrick, “Nobody’s Free Until Everybody’s Free”, FREE 
THE SLAVES BLOG (Jan. 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/JNV4-Y3RZ (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2020) (quoting Fannie Lou Hamer) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
